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 | | From: | nkdatta8839 | | Subject: | Pakistan Thinks Anew Of Kashmir Options | | Date: | 1 Dec 2004 05:26:13 -0800 |
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 | http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2004-daily/01-12-2004/oped/o1.htm
The News, Karachi, Pakistan
Wednesday December 01, 2004-- Shawal 18, 1425 A.H.
A new India policy needed
By M B Naqvi
mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk
...... It is time Islamabad realised when three and a half wars could
not loosen India's control over Kashmir, mere diplomacy stands even
less chance of achieving that goal. All aspects of Islamabad's India
policy, including the one of encouraging Islamic insurgency in
Kashmir, have not achieved much. Insistence on trying to reword or
rework it runs the risk of an eventual all out war. If durable peace
cannot be made, one way or another, collisions and war cannot be
avoided in coming years.
The bottom-line of what PM Shaukat Aziz said to his Indian counterpart
is tantamount to a return to the well-worn position of Kashmir being
the core issue: unless progress is made on it, other seven issues
cannot be resolved. It was a position that had been specifically given
up in order to get Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee to agree to restart the
Composite Dialogue. Can this reversion to the long held but barren
stance deliver the desired goodies? One of the more dangerous
implications of the policy of staking everything on the aim of somehow
wresting Kashmir from India can only be on the basis of threat of war
by Pak Army. Can war achieve the desired result? The answer is no.
Long before such a war, non-stop arms races with India remain the
outstanding reality. It has given Pakistan a skewed budget structure
that crowds out not only development, but reduces social sectors'
current spending also. It has made the society military-dominated and
prevented democracy from taking roots. It
perpetuates Pakistan's all-round backwardness. It is now increasing
poverty. Despite this huge cost, Kashmiris have not come an inch
closer to their Azadi. More of it can lead to Pakistan's destruction.
It is time we saw the limits of actual possibilities on Kashmir
clearly. If Pakistan would become more obstreperous on Kashmir, India
will invade Pakistan and the much tom-tomed atomic weapons will not
come into play, as they did not in 2002 and for the same reason of not
being deterrent enough to a nuclear India. Kashmiris, by their own
exertions, might achieve something, provided they struggle
non-violently. But if they continued to employ guns, they run the risk
of their own decimation: by using violence they are permitting India
to employ its superior violence-making machine and they have shown
they shrink not from employing overwhelming force against a largely
unarmed populace. Use of violent means either by Pakistanis or
Kashmiris now look like inviting a war between India and Pakistan. War
and violence has now to be eschewed completely as futile and
dangerous. .....
...... If war is out of the question on, and about, Kashmir - as indeed
it is - an alternative relationship with India becomes a must. There
will then be no point in staying distant or isolating Pakistan from
other friends of India. Now that Pakistan is forced to change stance
for many reasons, it will be far more logical and politic to cultivate
good relations with India. Let's gain what we can in free trade and
economic cooperation with it. It will make eminent sense to make India
committed to as many schemes of economic and cultural cooperation as
possible. The closer Pakistan gets to India, the less likelihood there
will be of India's hardliners spitting fire and brimstone against
minorities; India's secularism and democracy will be strengthened.
That is in Pakistan's enlightened self-interest. It will also
discourage more than merely incipient fascist forces in both
countries. .....
...... it is basically a new situation. Pakistan has inexorably and
increasingly to withdraw from the earlier full support to Kashmiris'
right of self-determination - through the plebiscite way. Now,
obviously and as the President says, the only likely solution that can
be arrived at is the one that India willingly accepts. For, that to
happen, the Kashmiris, rather than Pakistanis, should propose one or
more possible solutions. The Indians will only accept a solution if it
does not militate against their basic interests and even stances.
......
...... The net outcome of the talks so far is that no Kashmir solution
is available that replaces India's sovereignty over the Kashmir
territories with something better. Pakistan cannot go out and conquer
Kashmir; that makes war out of the question. If war is out of account,
all that remains is to choose between two possible policy options:
live without any settlement on Kashmir that will involve on present
indications, continuation of arms races, despite India being able
anyhow to increase the disparity in military strength while bilateral
relations remain strained. This will involve frequent crises and
tensions and exigencies of Kashmir situation may propel the countries
into conflict. This will mean war remaining built into the situation
the way it is today.
The second option is to change the nature of Indo-Pakistan
relationship after making a settlement on Kashmir on terms that are
acceptable to India. MQM Chief Altaf Hussain's proposal to accept the
LOC as the border may be painful if stated baldly. But it is realistic
and is based on the only basis that will be acceptable to India. His
"for the time being" makes no sense. Once a border has been made a
border, it will have to remain a border. Any attempt to change it will
become aggression - and pointless if war is to be avoided.
In the context, the Manmohan Singh formula, if one can call it that -
India and Pakistan simultaneously giving maximum autonomy to their
respective Kashmir, everything to be delegated to them except a few
subjects, and making all borders (LOC included) soft - is a better
version; it is Altaf Hussain's basic idea clothed with attractive
raiment. This formula too will entail a lot of negotiations. The
raiment will need to be strengthened with policies pledged by both
countries to be watched over by each other and the civil society in
either country. .....
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http://www.dawn.com/2004/11/29/op.htm#5
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
29 November 2004 Monday 16 Shawwal 1425
Hard talk on Kashmir
By M.P. Bhandara
...... let us recall some basics by standing firm on 'terra-firma':
* India is not likely to agree to any change in Kashmir status, such
as joint sovereignty or UN mandate. Reason: This will require a
constitutional change passed by the Indian parliament, which requires
a two-thirds majority vote.
* Pakistan is not likely to accept the LoC as an international border.
Reason: We have been offered this consolation prize since the 1950s
and its rejection has been the cornerstone of our Kashmir policy ever
since.
* A modicum of clear-headed thinking will concede that there has never
been a Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) problem as such. The problem relates to
the Valley alone. There is no secessionist movement in any part of the
old J&K state currently controlled by India or Pakistan. All parts of
J&K excepting the Valley are better integrated in Pakistan and India
than say FATA in Pakistan and NEFA in India.
The dispute is Valley-centric. The one Kashmiri leader who commands a
surer political base in the Valley than any other in the APHC is the
spiritual and political leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.
He is reported as saying "We cannot ignore the fact that three regions
- Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh - represent different cultures, languages
and ideologies. The people of Jammu and Ladakh don't support the
freedom movement. In fact, they have a lot of complaints against us
(the APHC and other freedom groups)."
The Kashmir Valley, which was once regarded as a heaven on earth
because of its beauty and grandeur - and nowadays more of a hell on
earth because of the blood trail - is area-wise a tiny fraction of the
old J&K state which nominally included the northern territories of
Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit.
I submit three prerequisites for peace, before we can think of a
solution. One, India should recognize Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Hunza and
Baltistan as parts of Pakistan and likewise Pakistan should recognize
Ladakh and Jammu as integral to India.
To legitimize this mutual award, internal referendums in these
territories should be held under the supervision of the respective
India and Pakistan Human Rights Commissions.
Voters be given three choices: Total integration with India/Pakistan
or autonomy with special status in India or Pakistan as the case may
be. I do not envisage a joint human rights referendum body.
Each referendum commission shall consist of its own well-known
nationals having administrative experience and a human rights track
record. Likewise, law enforcement officers should be selected on the
same basis. The internal referendums should be open to international
monitoring.
The second prerequisite is for both countries to remove the engines of
violence. If India is to substantially demilitarize the Valley,
Pakistan must ensure that the so-called "liberation" camps in Pakistan
are closed down.
According to the latest Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) report, "83
training camps are in operation, 47 in AJK, 10 in the Northern areas,
and 26 in other parts of Pakistan".
UN observers should be given access to any pointations made by India
and as mutual confidence grows, the Indians themselves may be given
this access on a mutual basis.
The third and most important part of the peace process is to grant
autonomy to the Valley, where the "sky is the limit" as conceded by
two former Indian prime ministers on a freshly negotiated format
between the Indian government, APHC and the current government in
Kashmir.
The Valley administration shall consist of its citizenry with police
power drawn exclusively from locals to take care of security. The
title of prime minister should be restored to the elected chief
minister of Kashmir (preferably elected by open general franchise) and
the Valley administration should have the power to regulate trade and
immigration matters with Pakistan and other countries.
Any solution lies in a process requiring patience and flexibility. Yet
another factor that helps in such emotionally charged cases is
ambiguity. An example in this regard is Northern Ireland.
Ambiguity as regards the final solution has stopped violence. This is
the key to any solution. If the end point is cut and dry, it will be
subjected to darts and nails in the incubator. Ambiguity reinforces
hope in all stakeholders to achieve their desired ends.
The Valley's historical direction has always been towards the areas
which are now in Pakistan. If we were to declare that our immediate
intention is a sovereign Valley there is little hope of India
agreeing.
Indeed, any Indian government making such a proposal will be shown the
door the very next day. But, given ambiguity, the consanguinity of
peoples, the exchange of trade and visitors will over a period of time
make sovereignty an irrelevant issue. The outstanding example of this
is little Andorra wedged between Spain and France.
India agreeing. Indeed, any Indian government making such a proposal
will be shown the door the very next day. But, given ambiguity, the
consanguinity of peoples, the exchange of trade and visitors will over
a period of time make sovereignty an irrelevant issue. The outstanding
example of this is little Andorra wedged between Spain and France.
During a recent Kashmir conference which invited a former general well
known for his jihadist views, the bottom-line of his swan song was:
just slog on with the Kashmir jihad as we have for the last 15 years.
Why don't these ardent fighters make a balance-sheet of the jihadist
period, which was financial bankruptcy, gaining one band of so-called
friend which were the Taliban of Afghanistan and losing goodwill among
our traditional friends - China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia apart from
being ostracized in the western world.
The Taliban period in 1990s was certainly the most unfortunate period
of our national existence. It was marked by religious extremism,
sectarianism, mega- political corruption, and a collapse of economic
indicators.
At the opposite end we have major political leaders who publicly and
privately have questioned the creation of Pakistan. At least one major
right-wing religious party, which opposed the Quaid's Pakistan tooth
and nail, now makes Kashmir and jihad the cutting edge of Pakistani
nationalism. Where do we proceed from here? .....
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| | From: | nkdatta8839 at bigmailbox.net | | Subject: | Re: Pakistan Thinks Anew Of Kashmir Options | | Date: | 18 Jan 2005 22:22:27 -0800 |
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| http://www.dawn.com/2005/01/17/op.htm#1
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
17 January 2005 Monday 06 Zilhaj 1425
Kashmir policy revisited
By Javid Husain
...... Pakistan has been engaged in changing in its favour the status
quo, which has existed in Kashmir for more than five decades.
In the prevalent power-based international system, this objective can
be achieved only if Pakistan mobilizes sufficient power in support of
its cause at national, regional and global levels to persuade India to
modify its stand that Kashmir is its integral part and come to a
mutually satisfactory settlement of the dispute taking into account the
wishes of the Kashmiri people.
International law and morality, can, at best, play a marginal role in
overcoming Indian intransigence. Let us see how Pakistan compares with
India in terms of national power.
India is not only eight times bigger than Pakistan in population terms,
it has consistently outperformed Pakistan in the economic field during
the past decade. The situation on the military side is no different
despite the high proportion of the national resources that Pakistan has
allocated to defence.
India also enjoys the advantage of a stable democratic setup which has
taken deep roots in its bodypolitik, as against Pakistan which has
suffered from political instability marked by controversies about the
Constitution, stunted growth of political institutions, repeated
experiments with military and authoritarian governments and a low level
of political maturity.
The situation at the regional and global levels is also not reassuring
from Pakistan's point of view. At the regional level, Pakistan managed
to isolate itself primarily because of its flawed Afghanistan policy,
particularly during the period from 1997 to September 2001.
Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that we are still
living both internally and externally with the adverse consequences of
that short sighted policy.
At the global level again, Pakistan is faced with heavy odds as far as
the Kashmir dispute is concerned. Even if we ignore the lingering
misgivings of the international community because of our pre-9/11
support to the Taliban, a quick survey of the international scene
should have a sobering effect on Pakistan's policymakers.
As a result of the radical transformation of the international
environment in the aftermath of 9/11, issues of terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been raised to the
top of the international agenda.
Promotion of democracy, safeguarding of human rights and development of
a market economy constitute other important objectives of the
international community. The focus on the issue of terrorism has
undermined the freedom movements in the Islamic world as the armed
struggle here is increasingly portrayed by the West as terrorism.
The reduced relevance of the United Nations to global and regional
issues of strategic importance, as in the case of the US invasion of
Iraq, has correspondingly reduced the significance of UN Security
Council resolutions for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes.
Increasingly now, decisions on important strategic issues are taken
elsewhere by the major powers and then taken to the Security Council to
give them a cloak of legitimacy. This trend has had a negative impact
on the UN Security Council resolutions relevant to Kashmir. Pakistan,
then, lacks the power to compel or persuade India to agree to a change
in the status quo in Kashmir.
It is not surprising that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared
unequivocally at Srinagar on November 17, 2004: "Let me say that I have
made it quite clear to President Musharraf that any redrawing of
international borders is something which is not going to be acceptable
to us. Any proposal which smacks of further division of our country on
the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us."
The point was reiterated by him in Lok Sabha on December 21. Later in
Rajya Sabha, Dr Singh added that he had emphasized to President
Musharraf the criticality of his fulfilling the reassurance of January
6, 2004, that any territory under Pakistan's control would not be used
to support terrorism in any manner. He went on to declare that "If this
does not happen, all other confidence-building measures would have no
meaning."
The Indian foreign secretary was equally blunt while talking to a group
of Pakistani journalists in New Delhi last month. If there was any
doubt left in the minds of our policymakers, the Indian foreign
secretary removed it by stressing in Islamabad at a press conference on
December 27 that "legally entire Jammu and Kashmir is part of India."
Little wonder that the latest round of Pakistan-India foreign
secretary-level talks ended without any progress on the Kashmir issue.
......
...... Our historical experience and the present situation call for a
radical revision of our Kashmir policy which should be based on a
long-term strategy. We need to recognize that a peaceful settlement of
the Kashmir dispute, which is satisfactory from Pakistan's point of
view, is not attainable in the short-term as Pakistan is in a much
weaker position compared with India nationally, regionally and
internationally.
Further, such a settlement would require painful compromises by both
India and Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that there is no national
consensus on the necessary concessions either in India or in Pakistan.
The statements by the Indian prime minister and foreign secretary
reflect this reality as far as India is concerned. The situation is not
much different in Pakistan. Both sides, therefore, need more time to
prepare their respective public opinions for the necessary flexibility
in dealing with the Kashmir issue. It would be a long-term process
whose outcome cannot be predicted with certainty at this time. .....
...... Finally, we need to remind ourselves that the Kashmiris are at
the centre of the dispute. Any settlement of the Kashmir dispute which
runs contrary to the wishes of the Kashmiri people cannot be viable or
sustainable.
We must, therefore, develop a deep understanding of their aspirations
by maintaining close political links with their political leadership
and avoid taking steps which would alienate them.
Above all, we should make Pakistan so attractive from the points of
view of political stability, economic development and cultural growth
that it should act as a magnate for the Kashmiri people.
In the long run, our ability to reach a satisfactory settlement of the
Kashmir issue with India would be directly proportionate to our success
in strengthening our internal political stability and outperforming
India in the field of economic development while maintaining a credible
military deterrent at the lowest possible cost.
Our inability to perform well in these areas would make the prospects
of a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute extremely bleak if
not non-existent.
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